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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4332 
___________ 
 
MARIO ALBERTO LOPEZ GARZA, 
The Executor of the estate of Hans Jorg Schneider Sauter, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITIGROUP INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-00537) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on September 27, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, 
and CONTI,* Chief District Judge 
 
(Opinion filed: February 2, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION** 
___________ 
                                              
*  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti, Chief Judge of the United States District Court 
for the Western District Court Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal concerns a transnational dispute over hundreds of millions of dollars 
allegedly due the estate of Mexican national Hans Jorg Schneider Sauter (“the Estate”), 
for which Appellant Mario Alberto Lopez Garza serves as executor.  The Estate filed in 
the District Court a one-count complaint (“the Complaint”) demanding an accounting by 
Appellee Citigroup Inc. on the premise that Citigroup controls the bank hosting the 
accounts with the disputed funds.  Whatever complexities there may be in the peripheries 
of this litigation, the questions before us in the Estate’s appeal are straightforward: (1) did 
the District Court err when it granted Citigroup’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; 
and (2) did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to grant leave to amend, 
both before dismissing the Complaint and later in denying the Estate’s motion for 
reconsideration?  Answering both questions in the negative, we will affirm.1 
I. 
 According to the Complaint, Schneider Sauter was a Mexican citizen and 
businessman involved in currency trading and real estate.  Apparently Mexican 
authorities believed that Schneider Sauter was engaged in illicit activity, and he served 
time in a Mexican prison.  After Schneider Sauter died in 2008, Garza was appointed by a 
probate court in Mexico to serve as executor of the Estate.   
                                              
 
1 We separately address Citigroup’s cross-appeal, which concerns only the District 
Court’s order granting in part Citigroup’s motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d). 
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Through his investigation of assets available to the Estate, Garza allegedly 
uncovered three documents indicating that substantial funds—no less than 
$300,000,000—were on deposit in accounts held in Schneider Sauter’s name at Banco 
Nacional de Mexico S.A. integrante del Grupo Financiero Banamex (“Banamex”), 
Citigroup’s “full-service bank subsidiary” in Mexico.  JA 44.  After Garza obtained 
several orders from the Mexican probate court directing Banamex to turn over to the 
Estate all funds in the Schneider Sauter accounts, Banamex instituted collateral amparo 
proceedings to challenge the legal authority of the probate court.2   
Stymied in the Mexican court system, the Estate brought the Banamex litigation to 
the United States courts, first by filing suit in the Southern District of New York, and 
then by filing the Complaint in the District of Delaware.  The only defendant named in 
the Complaint was Citigroup.  Citing the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”), Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 296-456, 605-800 (1993), the 
Expedited Funds Availability Act (“the EFAA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010, and Mexican 
law, the Estate alleged that Citigroup possesses information regarding the Banamex 
accounts because it “is required . . . to oversee, control and supervise the activity of its 
subsidiary banks.”  JA 46.  A single count in the Complaint demanded an “accounting” 
                                              
 
2 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained it, “the amparo is a highly 
complex legal institution . . . somewhat similar to habeas corpus and, inter alia, is the 
means to review and annul unconstitutional judicial decisions.”  United States v. Fowlie, 
24 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).  Citigroup represents that the 
amparo proceedings are still pending.   
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that would permit Garza to “ascertain all transfers of funds into and out of the bank 
accounts formerly belonging to the decedent.”  JA 47. 
Citigroup answered the Complaint and then filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) or, in the alternative, for a stay of all federal 
litigation pending resolution of the proceedings in Mexico.  In its Rule 12(c) motion and 
oral argument before the District Court, Citigroup argued under Delaware law that an 
accounting is strictly a remedy and, thus, cannot be pleaded as a stand-alone claim.  In 
any event, Citigroup contended, the Estate failed to sufficiently plead the fiduciary 
relationship between Schneider Sauter and Citigroup necessary to support an accounting 
action.  In response, the Estate urged the District Court that the Complaint stated a viable 
demand for an accounting and, alternatively, that leave to amend should be granted.   
The District Court granted Citigroup’s motion and dismissed the Complaint with 
prejudice.  The District Court agreed with Citigroup that the Estate’s “failure to plead any 
underlying substantive cause of action or fiduciary relationship renders its claim for an 
accounting legally invalid on its face under Delaware law.”  JA 19.  It concluded that the 
Complaint revealed no basis to impute to Citigroup any duty that Banamex—as host of 
the accounts with the disputed funds—might owe the Estate.  Deeming the Estate’s 
pleading defects to be incurable, the District Court denied leave to amend on futility 
grounds.   
The District Court also denied reconsideration, rejecting the Estate’s arguments 
that it should have been granted leave to amend with unspecified “additional facts,” JA 
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284, and that NAFTA provided a basis for a fiduciary relationship between the Estate and 
Citigroup.  This appeal followed.   
II.3 
 On appeal, the Estate argues, first, that the District Court erred in granting a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings because the Complaint adequately stated a claim 
for an accounting, and, second, that even if the Complaint were in any way defective, the 
District Court “should have granted the Estate an opportunity to amend [it].”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 39.4  Neither argument is persuasive. 
A.  The District Court’s Ruling on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
 A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed so 
long as the timing of the motion does not delay trial.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  “A motion 
                                              
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
order granting Citigroup’s motion under Rule 12(c) de novo, see In re Fosamax 
(Alendronate Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 165 n.11 (3d Cir. 2014), 
and “may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.”  Maher Terminals, LLC v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015).  The District Court’s order 
denying the Estate’s motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion, see 
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 
2016), as is its refusal to grant leave to amend.  See U.S. ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech 
Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 486 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
4  As a threshold matter, the Estate asserts that the District Court misapplied the 
Rule 12(c) standard when it failed to accept the veracity of certain allegations in the 
Complaint.  Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   However, there is no 
indication that the District Court failed to accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the 
Complaint.  In any event, accepting those allegations as true, we reach the same 
conclusion as the District Court on de novo review.  
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for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff has failed to state a 
claim is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”  Revell 
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).  Accordingly, judgment 
on the pleadings is proper where the plaintiff’s factual allegations, taken as true and 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are not sufficient to state “a claim for 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  
The federal pleading standard guides our assessment of whether the Estate’s 
Complaint sets forth a viable claim under applicable state law.  “As a federal court sitting 
in diversity, we ‘are required to apply the substantive law of the state whose laws govern 
the action.’”  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 1990)).  Here, the District 
Court chose to apply the law of Delaware, and the parties do not contest that choice on 
appeal. 
Delaware law provides a right to an accounting in specified situations, only one of 
which is potentially relevant here, i.e., “where a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
parties and a duty rests upon defendant to render an account.”  Pan Am. Trade & Inv. 
Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 94 A.2d 700, 701 (Del. Ch. 1953).  Citigroup contends 
that, even assuming an accounting demand can be maintained under Delaware law as a 
stand-alone claim,5 the Estate failed to sufficiently plead the requisite fiduciary 
                                              
5 The Delaware Supreme Court characterizes an accounting as an “equitable 
remedy.”  See, e.g., Rebstock v. Lutz, 158 A.2d 487, 489 (Del. 1960).  And the Delaware 
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relationship.  We agree that no such relationship is apparent from the facts in the 
Complaint, and the District Court therefore properly granted Citigroup’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.   
The thrust of the Estate’s main argument for recognizing Citigroup as a fiduciary 
flows from a critical assumption built into the Complaint:  that there is a duty owed by 
Banamex to Schneider Sauter as its depositor.  From that relationship, the Estate would 
extrapolate a duty to Citigroup on the ground that Banamex is allegedly a “subsidiary 
bank[].”  JA 46.  The problem with this theory is that, under Delaware law, “the relation 
between a bank and a mere general depositor of funds is that of debtor and creditor, and 
is in no sense of a fiduciary nature.”  Tharp v. St. Georges Tr. Co., 34 A.2d 253, 255 
(Del. Ch. 1943); cf. Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 53 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (“Creditor-debtor relationships such as that between the Bank and Paradise 
rarely are found to give rise to a fiduciary duty.”).  And if Schneider Sauter is not owed a 
fiduciary duty by Banamex, then a fortiori there is no such duty that can be imputed to 
Citigroup as Banamex’s alleged corporate parent.  See Greco v. Univ. of Delaware, 619 
A.2d 900, 903 (Del. 1993) (imputing liability requires underlying liability). 
                                                                                                                                                  
Code does the same.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3581(b)(4) (2017).  The Delaware 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a demand for an accounting may be 
pleaded as a stand-alone form of action, but we need not predict how this state law issue 
ultimately will be resolved because, even assuming an accounting demand can be pleaded 
without a companion claim, the Estate’s Complaint was properly dismissed on Rule 12(c) 
grounds.  
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The Estate’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  Even if the Estate were 
correct that it is owed a fiduciary duty from Banamex, that duty could not pass to 
Citigroup without piercing the legal veil that generally shields a parent corporation from 
the acts of its subsidiaries.  See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998).  
“Persuading a Delaware court to disregard the corporate entity,” however, “is a difficult 
task,” Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc., L.P. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 
1175, 1183 (Del. Ch. 1999) (citation and internal quotations omitted), and, as Citigroup 
correctly points out, the factual allegations in the Complaint, taken as true, reveal not 
“Citigroup’s control of Banamex’s day-to-day operations or a complete disregard of the 
corporate form between the two entities,” but instead “the expected level of supervision 
by a parent company of its foreign subsidiary.”  Appellee’s Br. at 28.  Thus, the District 
Court properly determined that the Complaint lacked factual allegations necessary to 
support veil-piercing under Delaware law.  See Outokumpu Eng’g Enter., Inc. v. 
Kvaerner EnviroPower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729-30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (discussing 
alter-ego and agency theories of liability for corporate parent).   
The Estate is no more successful with its argument that the sources of law cited in 
the Complaint—from jurisdictions other than Delaware—show Citigroup owed a 
fiduciary duty to Schneider Sauter directly, rather than through the conduit of Banamex.  
The NAFTA provision cited in the Complaint imposes obligations on parties to the treaty 
with respect to their treatment of foreign financial institutions and investors in those 
institutions; it does not impose new obligations on banks to their customers.  See 32 
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I.L.M. at 657-63; cf. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 412 n.12 (5th Cir. 2005) (individual 
citizen of Canada was not a “beneficiary of NAFTA”).6  For its part, the EFAA merely 
requires that “depository institution[s]” make available for prompt withdrawal their 
customers’ deposited funds.  See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 
516 U.S. 264, 267 (1996).  It thus has no bearing here, insofar as the Complaint alleged 
that the disputed funds had been deposited into accounts with Banamex, not Citigroup.  
Finally, the Estate posits that Mexican law “require[s] banks to turn over funds 
immediately to an Estate in the event of the death of an account holder,” JA 45, but 
conclusory legal assertions need not be credited without supporting factual allegations in 
reviewing a motion under Rule 12(c), see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and, even if credited, 
the Mexican law described by the Estate would appear to impose an obligation only on 
the bank holding the decedent’s funds—again, Banamex, not Citigroup. 
In sum, even accepting as true the factual allegations in the Complaint and 
considering the various sources of law to which it cites, the Estate failed to plead a viable 
accounting action against Citigroup under Delaware law.  The District Court thus did not 
err when it granted Citigroup’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
                                              
6 Moreover, contrary to the Estate’s argument in the District Court that NAFTA 
permits it “to bring suit in the United States against the party that has sought and obtained 
Mexican permission to operate in Mexico, namely Citi,” JA 284, federal law expressly 
disclaims the availability of a private right of action under NAFTA.  See 19 U.S.C. § 
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B.  The District Court’s Denial of Leave to Amend.  
In arguing that leave to amend should have been granted, the Estate attacks both 
the District Court’s pre-judgment denial of leave to amend and its refusal to reconsider.  
We perceive no error in either of those rulings.  
The Estate requested leave to amend, as an alternative to dismissal, in its 
opposition to Citigroup’s Rule 12(c) motion and at oral argument on the motion.  It later 
argued in support of reconsideration that the District Court erred when it dismissed the 
Complaint with prejudice “rather than granting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend.”  JA 
283.  At none of those junctures, however, did the Estate proffer a proposed amended 
complaint or even describe with any detail the substance of the putative pleading.7  Our 
precedent is clear that district courts act within the bounds of their discretion when they 
reject undeveloped requests for leave to amend that, like the Estate’s, are unaccompanied 
by a proposed amended pleading.  See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete 
                                                                                                                                                  
3312(c). 
 
7 Indeed, the Estate did not submit a proposed amended complaint until the filing 
of its reply brief in support of reconsideration, a submission the District Court was well 
within its discretion to refuse to consider.  See D. Del. LR 7.1.5(a) (2010).  Although the 
District Court signed off on a stipulation between the parties permitting the Estate to file 
a reply in this case, its willingness to consider the Estate’s rebuttal to arguments raised in 
Citigroup’s responsive briefing was not an open invitation to submit an amended 
complaint at that late stage and does not excuse the Estate’s untimely submission.  
Moreover, the District Court’s Local Rules require that a party seeking leave to amend 
attach to his request two documents:  “[t]he proposed pleading as amended” and “[a] 
form of the amended pleading which shall indicate in what respect it differs from the 
pleading which it amends, by bracketing or striking through materials to be deleted and 
underlining materials to be added.”  D. Del. LR 15.1 (2010).  The Estate failed to attach 
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Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 
(3d Cir. 2000).  For that reason alone, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when 
it refused to grant leave to amend before judgment or upon the Estate’s motion for 
reconsideration.   
A proper motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) must be based on 
one of three grounds:  “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability 
of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest 
injustice.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  None 
pertain here.  The Estate’s motion for reconsideration provided nothing in the way of new 
or overlooked law or facts to impugn the District Court’s ruling that amendment would 
be futile.  And, in fact, the District Court, going beyond what was required in this case, 
carefully considered the Estate’s argument that a fiduciary relationship existed between 
the Estate and Citigroup, as well as the extra-pleading evidence offered in support of that 
argument, before it granted Citigroup’s Rule 12(c) motion and denied the Estate’s motion 
for reconsideration.  The District Court’s thorough analysis confirms that there was no 
error—much less “clear error” or “manifest injustice”—in its conclusion on 
reconsideration that leave to amend would be futile because the Estate could not 
adequately plead a plausible claim for relief.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.     
 The cases cited by the Estate are not to the contrary.  In United States ex rel. 
Customs Fraud Investigations v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2016), the district 
                                                                                                                                                  
the latter document to its reply.  
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court granted the defendant’s Rule 12(b) motion “with prejudice, without any discussion 
of why [the relator-plaintiff] should not be afforded the opportunity to amend its 
complaint to solve any perceived deficiencies.”  Id. at 247.  By contrast, the District 
Court here explained in its opinion why it was granting Citigroup’s motion with prejudice 
and denying leave to amend.  Additionally, in Victaulic, after the relator-plaintiff’s 
complaint was dismissed, it promptly filed a motion for leave to amend that included “a 
proposed First Amended Complaint.”  Id.  Here, however, the Estate, in moving for 
reconsideration after dismissal, merely alluded to unspecified “additional record 
evidence” that it obtained “[b]ased on ongoing investigation,” JA 284, and it failed to 
submit a timely proposed amended pleading. 
Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey, 907 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 
1990), is even farther afield.  In that case, the district court mistakenly believed “that it no 
longer had the power to entertain amendments once the original complaint had been 
dismissed” for lack of standing.  Id. at 1416.  We vacated the district court’s order 
denying leave to amend because:  (1) an adverse judgment, even one based on a 
determination that the case is non-justiciable, is not a complete impediment to 
amendment; and (2) the NAACP’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend was 
accompanied by a “proposed amendment” that was “not facially meritless.”  Id. at 1417.  
In contrast, the District Court here did not misunderstand the scope of its power to grant 
leave to amend and, again, the Estate failed to accompany its requests for such relief with 
a properly formulated proposed amended pleading.   
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In the last case cited by the Estate on this point, Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002), we held that, notwithstanding the enactment 
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq., pro se plaintiffs 
proceeding in forma pauperis “who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or 
futile.”  Id. at 114.  The applicability of the sua sponte amendment rule, however, is 
cabined to cases like Grayson; “[i]n non-civil rights cases, the settled rule is that properly 
requesting leave to amend a complaint requires submitting a draft amended complaint.” 
Fletcher-Harlee, 482 F.3d at 252-53.8 
 In sum, under applicable precedent and the standard for motions under Rule 59(e), 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant leave to amend and 
denying reconsideration. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s orders dismissing the case and 
denying reconsideration will be affirmed.  
                                              
8 In addition to Victaulic, Newark Branch, NAACP, and Grayson, the Estate’s 
opening brief cited non-precedential opinions of this Court.  As we have pointed out on 
multiple occasions, however, such opinions “‘are not regarded as precedents that bind the 
court because they do not circulate to the full court before filing.’” In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 (2002)); 
accord Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 427 (3d Cir. 2016).   
